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Freedom of speech, although one of the most formidable
rights granted by the Constitution, is subject to restrictions
when the exercise of one's freedom to speak interferes with the
rights of another.' In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,2 a
woman's right to reproductive choice was confronted by freedom
of expression as exercised by a group of antiabortionists.3 The
United States Supreme Court upheld parts of a permanent in-
junction that restricted anti-abortion protesters to a speech-free
buffer zone. 4 The Court promulgated a new standard for deter-
mining the constitutionality of a speech-limiting injunction: if
the injunction is content-neutral5 and "burden[s] no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government inter-
est," it is not violative of the First Amendment. 6
Part II of this casenote outlines the case history of speech-
limiting injunctions, 7 addresses the violence inherent in the
abortion debate.8 Part III discusses the facts, procedural his-
1. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
2. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
3. Id. at 2523.
4. Id. at 2521. The injunction prohibited "pro-lifers" from obstructing access
to the clinic and from demonstrating within 36 feet of the Aware Woman Center
for Choice. Id. at 2522. See infra note 132.
5. A content-neutral injunction is one that is granted without reference to the
subject of the communication. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
6. Id. at 2525.
7. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 97-123 and accompanying text.
1
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tory, and holding of Madsen.9 Part IV addresses the Supreme
Court's newly-promulgated standard in light of the case history
leading up to its birth, and the violence and unrest spawned by
the abortion issue which surrounded it. This part further ad-
dresses the questionable necessity of the standard, and whether
the Court properly applied this standard to the injunction at
issue in Madsen. Part V concludes that although the Court
failed to implement a tenable standard in Madsen, through its
holding, it enabled courts to fend off violent antiabortionists
with injunctions.
II. Background
A. The First Amendment
The United States Constitution guarantees an individual's
right to speak freely and express themselves openly. 10 The pur-
pose of the First Amendment is to promote the free exchange of
ideas,1 ' political discussion, 12 and even to invite dispute. 13 It
maintains the ability of citizens to express their views although
such espousal of ideas may offend or disturb others.' 4
9. See infra notes 124-227 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
11. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrruTIoNAL LAw 939-41
(1991) (there are various justifications for the right of free speech, including:
preventing government suppression, enhancing self-fulfillment, nurturing self-
government, and checking abuse of power by government officials).
12. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965).
13. Id. at 551-52.
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dis-
pute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike
at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech ... is ...
protected against censorship or punishment .... There is no room under
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead
to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant polit-
ical or community groups.
Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)).
14. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). The Court struck down a state
statute forbidding the desecration of the national flag. Id. at 419-20. The Court
held that a state may not prohibit free expression for fear that the offended audi-
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This license, although it provides means through which
political, social, and economic change may be achieved, is not an
absolute right.15 Indeed, the Court has found that freedom of
speech is "narrower than an unlimited license to talk."16 There-
fore, speech designed to facilitate political discussion is guaran-
teed the utmost constitutional protection.17 However, speech in
the context of violence,' 8 obscenity,19 defamation,20 and fighting
words, 21 is of "such slight social value as a step to [the] truth
that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality."22 Conse-
quently, speech of this type is afforded little, if any,
constitutional protection.23
ence might disturb the peace. Id. at 418-20. "If there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disa-
greeable." Id. at 414.
15. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at 942-44. However, it has been ar-
gued that the freedom should only be restricted if there is an imminent danger of
placing the country in peril. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes expressed that "we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
16. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961).
On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has
been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. On the other
hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been re-
garded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Con-
gress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by
subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutional-
ity which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest
involved.
Id. at 50-51 (footnote and citations omitted).
17. N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
18. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
293 (1941).
19. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
20. Id. (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)).
21. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).




B. Restrictions on Free Speech
Although it is true that various forms of speech and expres-
sion are valued at different levels, 24 thereby affording degrees of
protection to each,25 even the most highly revered speech may
be subjected to restraint.26 Constitutionally protected speech,
such as speech designed to facilitate political discussion, may
interfere with other constitutional guarantees in the way the
message is expressed; in those instances, regulations are some-
times promulgated to ensure that the expression of ideas does
not infringe upon those rights.27 Restrictions on free speech
may be promulgated by the federal, state, or local governments
and are subject to judicial scrutiny if constitutionally chal-
lenged.28 There are several factors that the Court must employ
in determining the validity of a speech-restricting enactment.29
1. Content-Based/Content-Neutral Distinction
a. Content-Based Restrictions
The primary inquiry the Court will make in determining an
enactment's constitutionality is whether the law is content-
based or content-neutral.30 A content-based regulation prohib-
its speech based upon the content or subject matter of the
speech.31 Any enactment that is content-based is held to a stan-
dard of strict scrutiny - the regulation must be necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn
24. See R.AV., 505 U.S. at 382-83.
25. Id.
26. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
27. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 50. These regulations may be justified if speech
subordinates valid governmental interests. Id. at 50-51.
28. Id.
29. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at § 16.45-16.48. The factors used
in evaluating speech restrictions are: 1) whether the restriction is content-based
or content-neutral; 2) where the speech is taking place; and 3) whether the restric-
tion is a statute or injunction. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at § 16.45-16.48.
30. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481 (1994); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994); In-
ternational Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
31. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. 2711 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 419 U.S. 781 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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to achieve that end.32 The First Amendment is adverse to pro-
scribing speech or expressive conduct because of disapproval of
the message communicated and, therefore, content-based regu-
lations are presumptively invalid.33
In Boos v. Barry,34 the United States Supreme Court held
that a statute prohibiting the display of signs critical of a for-
eign government within five hundred feet of that government's
embassy was unconstitutional. 35 Restrictions on public issue
picketing must be strictly scrutinized because "the First
Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the
principle that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. .'.. " 36 The fact that the statute sought
to restrict speech in a traditional public forum for assembly and
expression - the public street - further lessened the likelihood
of it being upheld.37 The Court held that the government's
power to restrict such protected speech was "very limited."3s
In the event the government determines that an entire
class of speech is impermissible, resulting in the prohibition of
its expression, that prohibition is deemed to be content-based. 39
To determine if a content-based restriction on protected speech
is constitutional, the Court applies the following test: if the
state can show that the regulation is necessary to serve a com-
pelling state interest, and the regulation is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end, it will survive in accordance with the First
32. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
33. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). The Court found that
there were limited areas in which speech regulations based on content were per-
missible, such as fighting words, defamation and obscenity. Id. at 382-83.
[Tihese areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be reg-
ulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defa-
mation, etc.) - not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to
the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimi-
nation unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the gov-
ernment may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.
Id. at 383-84 (emphasis in original).
34. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
35. Id. at 317-18.
36. Id. at 318 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
37. Id. at 318.
38. Id. (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).




Amendment. 40 In applying this standard to the facts in Boos,
the Court concluded that there was no compelling interest in
preserving the dignity of foreign officials. 41 Thus, the Court
held that the statute unconstitutional. 42
b. Content-Neutral Restrictions
Content-neutral restrictions, conversely, are justified with-
out reference to the message the expression conveys. 3 A con-
tent-neutral restriction will be considered valid if it is "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ...
leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information."" The most common type of content-neutral
regulations are those reasonably restricting the time, place or
manner of the expression.45
Time, place, and manner restrictions seek to limit when,
where, and how expression takes place, but not the content of
that expression.46 In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Edu-
cators'Ass'n,47 the United States Supreme Court defined the el-
ements of a valid time, place, and manner restriction.48 First,
the regulation must be content-neutral, as discussed above. 49
Second, the regulation must be "narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
nificant government interest."50 Finally, the regulation must
leave open ample alternatives for communication.5' In promul-
gating these factors, the Court has held that even constitution-
ally protected speech may inflict unwanted intrusion into the
general public's senses.52
40. Id. at 321 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
41. Id. at 322.
42. Id. at 321.
43. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
44. Id.
45. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREA-
TISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 3.02[3] (1994).
46. Id.
47. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).




52. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding that a guide-
line limiting the volume of music coming from a bandshell was constitutional).
The main inquiry in determining a regulation's validity is its content-neutrality. If
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2. Location of Speech
a. The Public Forum
Where the expressive conduct takes place is a determina-
tive factor in assessing the constitutionality of a speech-limiting
enactment. 53 While restricting speech on private property may
be valid,54 the same restriction on a public street may be inva-
lid.55 Perry defined the traditional public forum as "[a] place[ ]
which by long tradition or by government fiat [has] been de-
voted to assembly and debate,"56 and where "the rights of the
State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed."57
The public street is such a forum.58 Thus, to restrict a constitu-
tionally protected form of speech on the public street, the con-
tent-neutral regulation must be "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication."59
b. The Captive Audience
People have a duty to "avert their eyes" if offended by a con-
stitutionally protected form of speech. 60 However, a special
problem is presented when the audience is captive.61 When a
person is confronted with a message she finds offensive in her
own home, she has a right to proscribe it.62 When the speech is
technically taking place in a traditional public forum, such as
the street and sidewalk in front of a residence, the question of
the regulation is not content-neutral, it is likely to be found unconstitutional on its
face. Id. at 791-92.
53. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
54. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
55. Id.
56. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The Court also described other types of public fora:
1) where the state opened an area "for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity"; and 2) public property which is neither a traditional nor designated fo-
rum for expression. Id. at 45-46.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Id. The streets "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communi-
cating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Id. (citing
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
59. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (citations omitted)).
60. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
61. See SMOLLA, supra note 45, at § 3.05[2].




how to maintain the freedom of speech while preserving the
right to privacy becomes less clear.63
Offensive or coercive expression, directed at a person in the
privacy of his or her own home, may be subject to limitation. 64
In Frisby v. Schultz,65 the Court upheld an ordinance prohibit-
ing targeted picketing of an individual's home.as Taking into ac-
count the fact that public streets are considered a traditional
public fora, 67 and any restrictions on speech taking place in
such surroundings must be judged against stringent standards
(i.e., demonstrating that the regulation is narrowly drawn to
serve a significant governmental interest), the Court deter-
mined that the ordinance was in harmony with the First
Amendment.6 8
The Court relied upon the factors set forth in Perry to deter-
mine the constitutional feasibility of the ordinance. The Court
examined the purpose of the restriction and held that the ordi-
nance was content-neutral because it banned only picketing
targeted at someone's home, not the message the expression
conveyed.69 Secondly, the Court analyzed whether the ordi-
nance was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest.70 In Frisby the compelling government interest was to
protect residential privacy and tranquility.71 The Court held
that the government may protect this freedom 72 and "individu-
als are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own
homes."73 The Court found the ordinance to be narrowly drawn
because picketing and marching, in general, were not prohib-
ited.74 Finally, the Court addressed the concern of whether am-
ple alternatives of communication were left open in the wake of
the statute.75 Because the prohibition of picketing aimed at
63. SMOLLA, supra note 45, at § 3.05[2].
64. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 488.
67. Id. at 481.
68. Id. at 481, 488.
69. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486-87.
70. Id. at 484.
71. Id. at 484-85.
72. Id. at 485.
73. Id.
74. Frisby, 489 U.S. at 486-88.
75. Id. at 488.
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someone's home did not eliminate the possibility of groups or
individuals expressing their views in residential neighborhoods
altogether, ample alternatives existed. 76 In Frisby, the Court
achieved a synergy between freedom of speech and the right to
privacy, exemplifying the ideal that rights guaranteed by the
Constitution can co-exist.
C. Protests and Violence
Just as obscene or threatening expression can be govern-
mentally regulated, so can certain forms of protests. Protests,
through such means as picketing, sit-ins, boycotts, and pam-
phleteering, have been fundamental in facilitating change. In-
stances of violence, however, may result in lowering the value of
the message involved.77 Consequently, certain time, place, and
manner restrictions may be placed on the otherwise constitu-
tionally sanctioned expression. 78 These instances, however,
have been found to be "special [and] limited."79
In Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc. ,80 a union dispute with a dairy company, over a distribution
system, culminated in various interferences with the company's
activities.8 ' The union engaged in "peaceful picketing" in front
of stores that carried the company's products, but also employed
violent tactics.8 2 The Court upheld an injunction that re-
76. Id. at 487.
77. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 45, at § 5.01[2][a][il.
78. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U.S.
287 (1941).
79. Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180
(1968).
80. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
81. Id. at 291.
82. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 291-92.
Besides peaceful picketing of the stores handling Meadowmoor's products,
the master [judge] found that there had been violence on a considerable
scale. Witnesses testified to more than fifty instances of window-smashing;
explosive bombs caused substantial injury to the plants of Meadowmoor and
another dairy using the vendor system and to five stores; stench bombs
were dropped in five stores; three trucks of vendors were wrecked, seriously
injuring one driver, and another was driven into a river; a store was set on
fire and in large measure ruined; two trucks of vendors were burned; a
storekeeper and a truck driver were severely beaten; workers at a dairy




strained all picketing activities, both violent and peaceful, be-
cause "[the picketing... was set in a background of violence."83
The Court held that where picketing is set "in a background of
violence" it could reasonably be concluded that although future
picketing could be wholly peaceful, the fear of past violence will
survive.84 Emphasizing that a state may not enjoin peaceful
picketing "merely because it may provoke violence in others," 5
the Court limited the scope of the restriction, holding that
where violence gave picketing a coercive effect "whereby it
would operate destructively as force and intimidation," a state
court may design an injunction prohibiting picketing only as
long as it counteracts continuing intimidation.86 The Court em-
phasized that in cases where restraint is warranted, any injunc-
tive relief should be defined by clear and guarded language.
87
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,88 the black citi-
zens of Claiborne County, Mississippi, boycotted white
merchants in response to unheard demands for racial equal-
ity.8 9 The merchants brought an action for injunctive relief and
damages against the N.A.A.C.P. 90 The Court held that "offen-
sive" and "coercive" speech is protected by the First Amend-
ment.91 It further noted that "one of the foundations of our
society is the right of individuals to combine with other persons
in pursuit of a common goal by lawful means."92 The act of
peaceful pamphleteering, in an effort to inform the public, is
communication protected by the First Amendment.93 "The
severely beaten about the head while being told "to join the union"; carloads
of men followed vendors' trucks, threatened the drivers, and in one instance
shot at the truck and driver.
Id.
83. Id. at 294.
84. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 294. "In such a setting it could justifiably
be concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past violence would survive
even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful." Id.
85. Id. at 296.
86. Id. at 298.
87. Id.
88. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
89. Id. at 888.
90. Id. at 889-90.
91. Id. at 911.
92. Id. at 933.
93. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 910-11 (quoting Organization for a Bet-
ter Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
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claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive
impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of
the First Amendment."94 However, the Court recognized that
there may be "narrowly defined instances" justifying the gov-
ernment's regulation of protected speech.95
As the above cases illustrate, the Court has traditionally
taken a strict position in making speech restrictions as narrow
and precise as possible to preserve fundamental First Amend-
ment protection. Therefore, even where other rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution are infringed upon, the Court is
reluctant to restrain the reach of the First Amendment. How-
ever, where the Court finds lives endangered, it is willing to up-
hold regulations designed to protect this country's citizens. 96
D. Abortion Battles
Violent opposition to the legalization of abortion, from har-
assment of patients to murdering of doctors,9 7 has resulted in
94. Id. at 911 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971)).
95. Id. at 912. "A nonviolent and totally voluntary boycott may have a disrup-
tive effect on local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the strong gov-
ernmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such
regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association." Id.
(citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (citations
omitted)).
96. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916-17.
97. The violence at abortion clinics and reproductive health care centers has
ranged from arson to murder. Laurie Goldstein & Pierre Thomas, Clinic Killings
Follow Years of Antiabortion Violence, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al. Ac-
cording to the records compiled by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
(ATF) and clinics, "the tally of violence over the past twelve years includes 123
cases of arson, 37 bombings in 33 states, and more than 1500 cases of stalking,
assault, sabotage and burglary." Id. In 1994 alone, one doctor, his security escort,
and two clinic receptionists were shot to death. Id. As a result of this violence,
abortion doctors have been forced to wear bullet-proof vests; some have been com-
pelled to carry weapons. Slaying Has Abortion Providers Up in Arms - Literally,
N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1993, at A16. The slaying referred to in the title is that of
Dr. David Gunn, who was slain outside the clinic at which he performed abortions.
Id. The next year, Dr. John Britton and his security escort, Air Force Lt. Col.
James Barrett were shot and killed outside of the same clinic. Kathy Sawyer,
Turning From "Weapon of the Spirit" to the Shotgun, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
1994, at Al. On July 29, 1994, Dr. John Britton, an abortion provider, was shot
and killed in front of the clinic where he worked. Convicted of the 1994 murders in
Pensacola, Florida is ex-minister Paul Hill, a known opponent to abortion rights,
who frequently protested at this clinic. Finally, in Brookline, Massachusetts, two
11
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various organizations, abortion providers, and woman's rights
supporters choosing to fight back in the courtroom.9 The judi-
cial remedies used to alleviate these occurrences have ranged
from fines and injunctive relief to criminal prosecution. 99
Although the courts have striven to maintain peace in the area
of the abortion clinics, they have continuously struggled to
achieve a balance between the right of abortion doctors, staff
and patients to a safe environment, and the right of abortion
protesters to express their views. 100
1. The Courts
In Frisby v. Schultz,101 picketing targeted at the home of a
local doctor who performed abortions resulted in an ordinance
prohibiting such tactics. 10 2 Although the activities engaged in
by the protesters were generally peaceful, they had spent over
an hour picketing in front of the doctor's residence, on at least
six occasions, in groups ranging from eleven to over forty peo-
ple.10 3 The antiabortionists brought suit to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the ordinance. 104 However, the Court found that such
exclusive attention directed at one person in his home rendered
him captive to the message being expressed, thereby warrant-
ing the ordinance. 05
abortion clinic receptionists were shot to death in December 1994. Goldstein &
Thomas, at Al.
98. See Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624 (l1th Cir.
1992) (the plaintiff attempted to use a civil rights conspiracy statute against abor-
tion protesters); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir.
1991) (discussing an action for trespass and interference with contract); Roe v.
Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990) (the court granted permanent in-
junctive relief against blockade of abortion clinics).
99. See, e.g., Lucero, 954 F.2d 624; Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857.
100. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993); and National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798
(1994).
101. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
102. Id. at 476. The ordinance, implemented in 1985, made it unlawful for any
person to engage in picketing before or about the residence of any individual. Id.
at 477.
103. Id. at 476.
104. Id. at 477.
105. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486-88.
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In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,0 6 abortion
clinics attempted to invoke the Ku Klux Klan Act 0 7 to prevent
anti-abortion demonstrations from being conducted in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. 08 Operation Rescue had
repeatedly performed "'rescue' operations that violate[d] local
law and harm[ed] innocent women."109 The militant group had
engaged in such "malicious conduct" as "defacing clinic signs,
damaging clinic property, and strewing nails in clinic parking
lots and on nearby public streets." 10 The theory of the abortion
rights supporters in this action was that by conducting such
demonstrations, the abortion protesters were conspiring to de-
prive women of their right to interstate commerce."' The
Supreme Court found, however, that the Ku Klux Klan Act did
not provide a federal claim against persons blocking clinic
access."
2
In National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,"13
women's rights organizations and abortion clinics successfully
argued that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (hereinafter R.I.C.O.) 1 4 could be applied to certain an-
106. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (West 1996).
108. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (West 1996) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, or of the equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of
any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such
State or Territory the equal protection of the laws.., the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against one or more of the conspirators.
Id. at 758 n.1.
109. Id. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 781.
111. Id.
112. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758. For further discussion of Bray, see Lisa J.
Banks, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme Court's License
for Domestic Terrorism, 71 DENY. U. L. REV. 449 (1994); Randolph M. Scott-Mc-
Laughlin, Operation Rescue Versus a Woman's Right to Choose: A Conflict Without
a Federal Remedy?, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 709 (1994).
113. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
114. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West 1984). R.I.C.O. states as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
lection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a prin-
13
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tiabortion groups. 115 The complaint alleged that the defendants
were "members of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abor-
tion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity" 116 and
that they conspired to use force, violence, or fear to induce clinic
workers to give up their jobs, doctors to give up their right to
practice medicine, and patients to forego medical services at the
clinic. 117 The Court held that if the plaintiffs could prove the
defendants "conducted the enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity," they could maintain the action." 8
2. The Legislature
Although the battle lines of the abortion debate have been
drawn primarily in the courtrooms, 19 the common law has not
effectively deterred the violence occurring at the clinics. 120 In
cipal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds if such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec-
tion of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
115. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 802-03.
116. Id. at 801.
117. Id. at 801-02.
118. Id. at 806.
119. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
120. According to the House Report released with the passing of the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, "[tlhe laws currently in place at the
Federal, state, and local level have proven inadequate to prevent the violent con-
duct..." at the clinics. H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1994).
State and local law enforcement authorities have failed to address effec-
tively the systematic and nationwide assault that is being waged against
health care providers and patients. Enforcement of local laws such as tres-
pass, vandalism and assault have proven inadequate. In some localities, lo-
cal authorities have refused to act. In others, they have been unable to do so
effectively, which is due partially to the inherent inability of state law to
338
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response to the continued violence at reproductive health cen-
ters and clinics, Congress passed the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (hereinafter F.A.C.E.). 121 The Act
established penalties for interference, use of threats, or other
antagonistic activities directed at clinics. 122 The F.A.C.E. Act
also allows injunctive relief as a civil penalty.123 Thus, court-
issued injunctions have become the most effective means to stop
the violence and ensure the right of women to choose abortions.
deal with interstate law enforcement issues. In addition, state and local
criminal law is often unable to provide effective deterrence.
Id.
121. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 1994). The legislative history outlines the fol-
lowing statistical information regarding the unrest at abortion clinics from 1977 to
1993: 36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, 2 kidnappings, 327
clinic "invasions," and 1 murder. H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 120, at 6-7.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 120, at 6-7. The F.A.C.E Act provides:
(a) Prohibited activities. -Whoever-
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate
or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in
order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of per-
sons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services... shall
be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil reme-
dies provided in subsection (c), except that a parent or legal guardian of a
minor shall not be subject to any penalties or civil remedies under this
section for such activities insofar as they are directed exclusively at that
minor.
(b) Penalties. -Whoever violates this section shall-
(1) in the case of a first offense, be fined in accordance with this title, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense after a prior conviction
under this section, be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned
not more than [three] years, or both ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 1994).
123. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(c)(1)(B) (West 1994). See supra notes 101-02. 18
U.S.C.A. § 248 (c)(1)(B) (West 1994) provides for civil penalties:
In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may award appropriate
relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as the costs of suit and reason-
able fees for attorneys and expert witnesses. With respect to compensatory
damages, the plaintiff may elect, at any time prior to the rendering of final
judgment, to recover, in lieu of actual damages, an award of statutory dam-
ages in the amount of $5,000 per violation.
15
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III. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
A. Facts
The petitioners in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. 124
were members of Operation Rescue America (hereinafter Oper-
ation Rescue), a group whose goal is to close down abortion clin-
ics throughout the country.125 The Aware Woman Center for
Choice, operated by the Women's Health Center, Inc., a wo-
men's health care clinic, provided abortions and counseling to
its clients.126 Members of Operation Rescue engaged in picket-
ing and demonstrations in front of and around the clinic, essen-
tially blocking the entrance to the clinic.127
The members of Operation Rescue were extremely open
about their intent to have the clinics incapacitated. 28 They
stated to the press that they intended to shut down a clinic. 129
The literature of the organization stated that "their members
should ignore the law of the State and the police officers who
remove them from their blockading positions." 30 Women's
Health Center, Inc., brought an action for injunctive relief
prohibiting Operation Rescue members from engaging in these
activities. 131
B. Procedural History
In September 1992, a Florida trial court issued a perma-
nent injunction that imposed several general restrictions on Op-
eration Rescue, including those that would prevent the group
from blocking the clinic entrance and physically abusing people
trying to gain access to clinics located in Brevard and Seminole
County, Florida. 132 However, six months later the hazardous
124. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
125. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 n.2
(Fla. 1993), aff'd in part sub nom., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2516 (1994).
126. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 666.
127. Id. at 667.
128. Id. at 666-67 n.3.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Operation Rescue, at 666.
132. Id. at 666-67. The injunction contained the following restrictions:
A. Respondents, OPERATION RESCUE... are hereby enjoined from:
340 [Vol. 16:325
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conditions at the clinic continued. 133 The trial court found that
the injunction did not prevent Operation Rescue from impeding
access to the Aware Woman Center for Choice; groups ranging
from "a handful to a crowd of four hundred"13 4 would picket at
the entrance to the clinic's driveway, causing congestion and
hindering patients' access to the clinic. 135 The group would also
sing and chant, occasionally using bullhorns. 136
The harassment was not limited to the clinic grounds. 137
The trial court also found that members of Operation Rescue
would approach the "private residences or temporary lodging
places of clinic employees," tormenting the employees, as well
as their children. 138 They would ring the doorbell of an em-
ployee's neighbor, providing literature calling the employee a
"baby killer."139 Group members would stalk patients and staff
members as they left the clinic and would also trace the license
plate numbers of patients to gain their home addresses and sub-
sequently contact them.140 Most significantly, the anti-abortion
group had threatened violence "against Clinic patients, employ-
ees, and staff."' 4'
1. trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress
into or egress from any facility at which abortions are performed in Bre-
vard and Seminole County, Florida;
2. physically abusing persons entering, leaving, working or using any
services of any facility at which abortions are performed in Brevard and
Seminole County, Florida; and,
3. attempting or directing others to take any of the actions described in
Paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
B. Nothing in this Court's Order should be construed to limit [Operation Res-
cue's] exercise of [its] legitimate First Amendment rights, such as, but not
limited to, carrying signs, singing, and praying, in a manner which does not
violate [paragraphs] 1, 2, and 3 above ....
Id. at 667 n.4.
133. Id. at 667.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Operation Rescue, 626 So.2d at 667.




141. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 668. The trial court documented these
incidents: "On one occasion the communication to a clinic staff person took the
form of an attempt to invoke the wrath of God by shouting, 'I pray that God strikes
you dead now!'" Id.
17
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The trial court found that as a result of these activities, pa-
tients would experience greater hypertension and anxiety, caus-
ing them to require more sedation, increasing the risks already
attendant to an abortion procedure. 142 The trial court also had
evidence that the noise outside the clinic would cause more
stress in the patients during surgery and while they recuper-
ated.143 Furthermore, patients who were intimidated by the an-
tiabortionists would postpone the procedure until a later date,
also aggravating any existing risk associated with an abor-
tion. 44 Thus, the trial court amended the general restrictions
to prohibit specific acts engaged in by Operation Rescue. 45
On another occasion the doctor was followed as he left the clinic by a person
associated with the respondents who communicated his anger to the doctor
by pretending to shoot him from the adjoining vehicle. As a result of the
foregoing demonstrations and activities, and after a physician similarly em-
ployed was killed by an antiabortionist at a clinic in North Florida, this doc-




144. Operation Rescue, 626 So.2d at 668-69.
145. Id. at 669. The amended injunction prohibited Operation Rescue from
engaging in the following acts:
(1) At all times on all days, from entering the premises and property of the
Aware Woman Center for Choice...
(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, impeding, inhibiting, or in any
other manner obstructing or interfering with access to, ingress into and
egress from any building or parking lot of the Clinic.
(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demon-
strating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or private property
within thirty-six [sic] (36) feet of the property line of the Clinic .... An
exception to the 36 foot buffer zone is the area immediately adjacent to the
Clinic on the east .... The respondents must remain at least five [sic] (5)
feet from the Clinic's east line ....
(4) During the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon, on Mondays through Satur-
days, during surgical procedures and recovery periods, from singing, chant-
ing, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound
amplification equipment or other sounds or images observable to or within
earshot of the patients inside the Clinic.
(5) At all times on all days, in an area within three hundred [sic] (300) feet
of the Clinic, from physically approaching any person seeking the services of
the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate by ap-
proaching or by inquiring of the [members of Operation Rescue] ....
(6) At all times on all days, from approaching, congregating, picketing, pa-
trolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound amplification
equipment within three hundred [sic] (300) feet of the residence of any of the
(Clinic's] employees staff, owners or agents, or blocking or attempting to
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/11
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Operation Rescue brought suit in the Florida Supreme
Court, 14 6 challenging the constitutionality of the injunction, and
alleging that it violated the First Amendment. In Operation
Rescue, the Florida Supreme Court, finding that the injunction
met the "reasonableness test" for technical validity, 147 and that
the injunction was content-neutral,'" upheld the injunction. 149
However, in Cheffer v. McGregor,150 a case challenging the same
injunction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit struck it down.' 5' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to settle the apparent dispute between the
Florida Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals over the in-
junction's constitutionality.152
C. The Opinions
1. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court153 began its analysis by
finding that the Florida Supreme Court injunction was not con-
tent- or viewpoint-based, even though it applied only to the ex-
block, barricade, or in any other manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct
the entrances, exits or driveways of the residences of any of the [Clinic's]
employees, staff, owners or agents. The respondents and those acting in
concert with them are prohibited from inhibiting or impeding or attempting
to impede, temporarily or otherwise, the free ingress or egress of persons to
any street that provides the sole access to the streets on which those resi-
dences are located.
(7) At all times on all days, from physically abusing, grabbing, intimidating,
harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting persons en-
tering or leaving, working at or using services at the ... Clinic or trying to
gain access to, or leave, any of the homes of owners, staff, or patients of the
Clinic.
(8) At all times on all days, from harassing, intimidating or physically abus-
ing, assaulting or threatening any present or former doctor, health care pro-
fessional, or other staff member, employee or volunteer who assists in
providing services at the... Clinic.
Id.
146. Id. at 666.
147. Id. at 670.
148. Operation Rescue, 626 So.2d at 671.
149. Id. at 676.
150. 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993).
151. Id. at 712.
152. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 (1994).
153. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsberg. Id. at 2520.
19
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pression of abortion protesters. 54 The Court stated that: 1)
injunctions apply only to particular groups or individuals and
regulate activities or speech of groups; 2) injunctions are a re-
sult of the group's past actions as a result of a dispute; and 3)
parties seeking an injunction assert a violation of their rights.
The court hearing the action is charged with fashioning a rem-
edy for a specific deprivation, not with drafting a statute aimed
at the general public.155 Injunctions "by [their] very nature,
appl[y] only to a particular group (or individuals) and regu-
late[ ] the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group."156
Injunctions have this function "because of the group's past ac-
tions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties.
The parties seeking the injunction assert a violation of their
rights ... "157
The Court found the injunction to be content-neutral be-
cause it was not aimed at the message, but the conduct of the
petitioners.158 The Court analyzed the injunction by determin-
ing whether the speech regulation was adopted "without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech." 159 The purpose of
the injunction was then examined. 160 The fact that the petition-
ers shared the same viewpoint regarding abortion did not
demonstrate that the issuance of the order was motivated by
some invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose. 16' "In
short, the fact that the injunction covered people with a particu-
lar viewpoint [did] not itself render the injunction content- or
viewpoint-based." 16 2
The Court went on to address the differences between an
injunction and a statute.163 A statute is a legislative choice re-
garding promotion of particular societal interests.164 Thus, the
154. Id. at 2524 (noting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
155. Id. at 2523.
156. Id.
157. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
158. Id. at 2523-24.
159. Id. at 2523 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
160. Id. at 2523-24.
161. Id. at 2524.





MADSEN v. WOMEN'S HEALTH
standard for determining its constitutionality would be whether
the time, place, and manner regulation was "narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest."165 By contrast, in-
junctions "are remedies imposed for violations (or threatened vi-
olations) of a legislative or judicial decree."166 The Court stated
that "[i]njunctions also carry greater risks of censorship and
discriminatory application than do general ordinances." 67
There is a distinct advantage to injunctions: "they can be tai-
lored by a trial judge to afford more precise relief than a statute
where a violation of the law has already occurred." 168
The Court's evaluation of the inherent contrast between
statutes and injunctions resulted in the Court requiring a some-
what more stringent application of general First Amendment
principles in this context. 69 Usually, in evaluating speech-re-
stricting injunctions, the Court has relied upon "such general
principles while also seeking to ensure that the injunction was
no broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals." 70
Our close attention to the fit between the objectives of an injunc-
tion and the restrictions it imposes on speech is consistent with
the general rule, quite apart from First Amendment considera-
tions, 'that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the
defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs." 71
Thus, the Court required the injunction to meet the following
standard: the injunction must not burden more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest. 72
Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed each contested provision
of the injunction to see if it burdened more speech than neces-
165. Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
166. Id. (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953)).
167. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. "'[T]here is no more effective practical guar-
anty [sic] against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally.'" Id. (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. N.Y., 336 U.S. 106, 112-
13 (1949)).
168. Id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
169. Id. at 2525.
170. Id. (citing Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968)).






sary to accomplish its goal.173 The Court first addressed the
thirty-six foot buffer zone, which prohibited the petitioners from
"congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering
any portion of the public right-of-way or private property within
[thirty-six] feet of the property line of the clinic .... ."174 The
speech-free buffer zone required the petitioners to move to the
other side of the street across from the clinic, and away from its
driveway, 175 since the petitioners "repeatedly had interfered
with the free access of patients and staff."' 76 However, the
buffer zone also included private property to the north and west
of the clinic. 177
The Court distinguished between the buffer zone's applica-
tion to the clinic property and the public property. 78 The Court
emphasized the difference between "focused picketing banned
from the buffer zone and the type of generally disseminated
communication that cannot be completely banned in public
places, such as handbilling and solicitation."179 In this case, the
picketing was aimed directly at clinic patients and staff; the
purpose of the injunction was to protect their ability to gain ac-
cess to the clinic. 80 In light of the interests involved, the Court
held that the thirty-six foot buffer zone burdened no more
speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental
interest.' 8 '
In respect to the buffer zone around the private property,
the Court took a different stance, characterizing it as ex-
treme. 182 The Court stated that there was no evidence to prove
petitioners, standing on private property, had obstructed access
173. Id. at 2526-30.
174. Id. at 2526.
175. Id.
176. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
177. Id. at 2527.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2527 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988)).
180. Id. The Court stressed the fact that "Dixie Way [was] only 21 feet wide
in the area of the clinic." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527. In light of the failure of the
first injunction, it was unrealistic to allow the petitioners to stand on the sidewalk
and driveway of the clinic. Id. It had also been established at the evidentiary
hearing at the trial level that the buffer zone was narrow enough to place the peti-
tioners only 10 to 12 feet from the cars approaching and leaving the clinic. Id.
Protesters could still be seen and heard from the clinic parking lot. Id.
181. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
182. Id. at 2528.
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to the clinic.' 83 Thus, it was held that this provision "bur-
den[ed] more speech than necessary to protect access to the
clinic."184
The Court next addressed the "noise restriction" and
"images observable" provision of the injunction. 8 5 The Court
considered the place to which the restriction applied and ex-
pressed the importance of noise control around "hospitals and
medical facilities during surgery and recovery periods . -* "186
Hospitals are places where the ailing are treated and where
"'pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the
day's activity, and where the patient and his family ... need a
restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.' ' 1 87
Thus, the Court held that the limited noise restriction burdened
no more speech than necessary "to ensure the health and well-
being of the patients at the clinic." 88 However, the Court held
the "images observable" provision of the injunction to be uncon-
stitutional. 189 Although threats to patients were clearly pros-
cribable under the First Amendment, a blanket ban on all
displays was too broad to achieve its purpose of limiting the pa-
tients' anxieties. 90 Stating that it "is much easier for the clinic
to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears ...
the Court invalidated the "images observable" provision.' 9 '
Similarly, the Court invalidated a provision that prevented
the petitioners from approaching any person seeking the clinic's
services within 300 feet of the clinic, unless that person indi-
cated a desire to communicate. 92 Although the state had a le-
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. This provision of the injunction restrained the petitioners from "sing-
ing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound am-
plification equipment or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot of
the patients inside the Clinic" from 7:30 a.m. through noon, between Monday and
Saturday. Id., 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
186. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
187. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783-84, n.12
(1979) (citation omitted)).
188. Id. "The First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical
facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests."
Id.
189. Id. at 2528-29.






gitimate interest in protecting clinic patients and staff from
being stalked, a prohibition on all uninvited approaches could
not be justified. 9 3 The Court stated that without evidence that
the petitioners' speech was independently proscribable, or was
"so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a
threat of physical harm. This provision [could not] stand."194
The provision, therefore, burdened more speech than necessary
to serve a governmental interest in preventing intimidation and
ensuring access to the clinic. 95
The Court finally addressed the regulation relating "to a
prohibition against picketing, demonstrating, or using sound
amplification equipment within [300] feet of the residences of
the clinic staff." 96 The Court, while upholding the validity of
the noise restriction, invalidated the picketing aspect of the in-
junction. 97 The Court found the 300 foot zone to be too
broad. 98 Had the restriction been limited to targeted picketing,
it would have been sufficient to accomplish the desired result.199
2. Justice Stevens, Concurring in Part and Dissenting
in Part
Justice Stevens joined the Court's view in upholding the
thirty-six foot buffer zone around the clinic and the Court's
treatment of the noise and images observable provision. 200
However, he disagreed with the Court's treatment of the 300
foot buffer zone around the clinic and residential properties.20'
Justice Stevens believed that injunctive relief should have been
judged by a less stringent standard than legislation.20 2 Legisla-
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312
U.S. 287, 292-93 (1941)).
195. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. The Court also stated, "[als a general mat-
ter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insult-
ing, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2530.
198. Id.
199. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2531.
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tion, he reasoned, applies to the entire community, "regardless
of individual culpability," while "injunctions apply solely to an
individual or a limited group of individuals who, by engaging in
illegal conduct, have been judicially deprived of some liberty -
the normal consequence of illegal activity."203 Thus, while a
statute prohibiting demonstrations within thirty-six feet of the
clinic would probably violate the First Amendment, an injunc-
tion "directed at a limited group of persons who have engaged in
unlawful conduct in a similar zone might well be
constitutional."20 4
Justice Stevens addressed "two obvious dimensions" of the
standard governing injunctions: 1) it should be no more burden-
some that necessary to provide complete relief;20 5 and 2) "the
remedy must include appropriate restraints on 'future activities
both to avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its
consequences.' "206 Justice Stevens observed that the petition-
ers had repeatedly and tortiously violated an earlier injunction.
Thus, the injunction is "twice removed from a legislative pro-
scription applicable to the general public and should be judged
by a standard that gives appropriate deference to the judge's
unique familiarity with the facts."20 7
Justice Stevens then addressed paragraph five of the trial
court's injunction, which prohibited members of Operation Res-
cue from approaching individuals seeking the Clinic's serv-
ices.208 Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court finding this
clause to be constitutionally impermissible, stating that it did
not prohibit speech but a "species of conduct,"2°9 that being the
approach of the petitioners toward the patients, without their
203. Id.
204. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2531.
205. Id. (citing Califano v. Yamanski, 442 U.S. 682 (1979)). "In a First
Amendment context... the propriety of the remedy depends almost entirely on the
character of the violation and the likelihood of its recurrence. For this reason,
standards fashioned to determine the constitutionality of statutes should not be
used to evaluate injunctions." Id.
206. Id. (quoting Natl Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 697-98 (1978)).
207. Id. at 2532.





consent and in an intimidating manner.210 While he acknowl-
edged the idea that "sidewalk counseling" is protected by the
First Amendment, Justice Stevens argued that it "does not en-
compass attempts to abuse an unreceptive or captive audience,
at least under the circumstances of this case."211
Justice Stevens argued that the "physically approaching"
prohibition was "no broader than the protection necessary to
provide relief for the violations .... " 2 12 He noted that this por-
tion of the injunction was drafted to protect the clinic patients
and staff from being stalked.213 Justice Stevens concluded that
the prohibition against physically approaching anyone seeking
the services of the clinic was constitutionally permissible and,
therefore, should have been upheld.214
3. Justice Scalia, Concurring in the Judgment in Part
and Dissenting in Part
Justice Scalia,215 in direct contrast to Justice Stevens' opin-
ion, maintained that the injunction in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center Inc. was content-based. 21 6 Justice Scalia chal-
lenged the "brand-new for this abortion-related case" standard
promulgated by the Court, calling it "intermediate-intermedi-
210. Id. Justice Stevens again quoted the injunction, which forbade Opera-
tion Rescue to "encircle, surround, harass, threaten or physically or verbally abuse
those individuals who choose not to communicate with them." Id.
211. Id. at 2533. "One may register a public protest by placing a vulgar
message on his jacket and, in so doing, expose unwilling viewers .... Neverthe-
less, that does not mean that he has an unqualified constitutional right to follow
and harass an unwilling listener, especially one on her way to receive medical
services." Id. (citation omitted).
212. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2533.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Justice Scalia was joined in his dissent by Justices Thomas and Ken-
nedy. Id. at 2539.
216. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
"Because I believe that the judicial creation of a 36-foot zone in which only a par-
ticular group, which had broken no law, cannot exercise its rights of speech, as-
sembly, and association, and the judicial enactment of a noise prohibition,
applicable to that group and that group alone, are profoundly at odds with our
First Amendment precedents and traditions, I dissent." Id. at 2535.
350 [Vol. 16:325
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/11
MADSEN v. WOMEN'S HEALTH
ate" scrutiny.217 He argued that regardless of the "content" of
an injunction, it should be subjected to strict scrutiny.218
Justice Scalia enumerated three policy reasons for this con-
clusion.219 First, he asserted that injunctions may be aimed to
suppress ideas rather than to achieve a permissible governmen-
tal goal, regardless of whether it attacks content. 220 Second,
speech-restricting injunctions should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny, because they are "the product of individual judges rather
than legislatures - and often of judges who have been
chagrined by prior disobedience of their orders."22' Third, "the
injunction is a much more powerful weapon than a statute, and
so should be subjected to greater safeguards."222 Justice Scalia
asserted that anyone subjected to such an injunction may not be
able to file an immediate appeal, resulting in the silence of the
party subjected to the injunction, ultimately depriving the party
of a First Amendment defense. 223
Justice Scalia proceeded to discuss "reasons of precedent"
to subject injunctions to strict scrutiny.224 He began by likening
the injunction to a "prior restraint," "the prototype of the great-
est threat to First Amendment values."225 Since a prior re-
straint is afforded a "'heavy presumption' against its
217. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538.
218. Id. Justice Scalia argued that the real issue in Madsen was not "whether
intermediate scrutiny, which the Court assumes to be some kind of default stan-
dard, should be supplemented because of the distinctive characteristics of injunc-
tions; but rather whether those distinctive characteristics are not, for reasons of
both policy and precedent, fully as good a reason as 'content-basis' for demanding
strict scrutiny." Id. "And the central element of the answer is that a restriction
upon speech imposed by injunction (whether nominally content based or nominally
content neutral) is at least as deserving of strict scrutiny as a statutory, content-
based restriction." Id. (emphasis in original).
219. Id. at 2538-39.
220. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538. Justice Scalia relies on the following exam-
ple: "When a judge, on the motion of an employer, enjoins picketing at the site of a
labor dispute, he enjoins (and he knows he is enjoining) the expression of pro-union
views." Id. (emphasis in original).
221. Id. at 2539.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541.




constitutional validity," a speech restricting injunction should
be required to attain the same standard.226
IV. Analysis
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., the Court incor-
porated the desire to regulate the conduct accompanying
speech227 with the ultimate goal of preserving political discus-
sion.228 The Court established the standard that speech-limit-
ing injunctions burden no more speech than necessary to
achieve a significant government interest with the intention
that it be applied to injunctive relief, thus protecting the public
from the unfettered discretion of the trial court judge. 229 The
Court's holding in Madsen sought to establish a uniform stan-
dard for interpreting the constitutionality of injunctions re-
stricting free speech. 30 Thus, the requirement that a speech
restriction be "no more burdensome than necessary" was in-
tended to recognize the subtle distinctions between injunctions
and statutes. 231
The injunction at issue in Madsen was a content-neutral
time, place and manner restriction on the speech and conduct
associated with Operation Rescue.23 2 As such, it should have
been measured against a standard of intermediate scrutiny.233
The injunction was not issued because of the content of the
message being conveyed by the group, but because of the con-
duct accompanying the message. 234 The protesters were tres-
passing on clinic grounds, blocking clinic entrances, and
physically intimidating patients, despite a court order to the
contrary.235
The Court, attempting to promulgate a standard to be ap-
plied to content-neutral injunctions, distinct from the one ap-
226. Id. (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. O'Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971)).
227. Id. at 2527. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying note 170.
229. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525; see supra text accompanying notes 159-69.
230. See supra text accompanying note 170.
231. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 45-52, 160 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 43-44, 47 and accompanying text.
234. See supra text accompanying note 160.
235. See supra part III.B.
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plied to statutes, merely rephrased the intermediate standard
of scrutiny into a nebulous, indistinguishable standard. The
distinction between a "narrowly tailored" restriction and one
that "burdens no more speech than necessary" is im-
perceptible.2 36 Both speak of the extent to which an individual
can be restrained from engaging in her constitutionally pro-
tected actions to preserve the rights of other individuals.237 The
Court did not establish a new standard of scrutiny to be applied
to injunctions; it merely defined what "narrowly tailored"
means in terms of injunctive relief.238
The distinction between statutes and permanent injunc-
tions warrants a distinct standard to apply when testing the
constitutionality of a free speech restriction. While an ordi-
nance restricting First Amendment rights would apply to the
entire public, an injunction only focuses on an individual or
group that has unjustly curbed the rights of others. 239 Thus, the
Court should have adopted the approach Justice Stevens enun-
ciated in his dissent.240 Justice Stevens argued that a speech-
limiting injunction is constitutionally valid if (1) it burdens no
more speech than necessary to provide complete relief and (2)
includes appropriate restraints on future activity to eliminate
its consequence.241 This approach represents the idea that in-
junctions are designed to remedy a specific wrong precipitated
by a specific group.24 2 This position directly refutes Justice
Scalia's argument that an injunction is the functional
equivalent of a content-based statute.243 To ensure that the
court issuing the injunction does not abuse its discretion, the
injunction should include a time-limiting provision, so the in-
junction remains effective for only as long it is "counteracting
continuing intimidation."2"
236. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 43-52, 170-72.
238. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
239. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
242. See supra part III.C.2.
243. See supra part III.C.3.
244. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.




This approach is most similar to the Court's approach in
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,245 the
facts of which are similar to the issues prevalent in the war over
abortion rights. In the same way violent antiabortionists have
been documented bombing clinics, and shooting clinic doctors
and workers, the union in Milk Wagon Drivers bombed dairy
plants, smashed windows, and assaulted workers, which re-
sulted in serious injuries.246 The Court recognized that,
although the picketing at this particular dairy plant had been
peaceful, the undercurrent of violence was enough to justify en-
joining picketing completely.2 7
While prohibiting protests in the area of the clinic would
have been extreme, as would completely banning all images ob-
servable, the lower court had valid reasons for "burdening" as
much speech as it did by prohibiting protesters from entering
within 300 feet of the clinic and the residences of its employ-
ees.248 The lower court had sought to prevent the clinic from
being overrun by groups vehemently against its mission, while
maintaining the right of those groups to express themselves. 249
However, the protesters ignored the original injunction. 250
In Madsen, the events occurred in a volatile setting. There
were allegations of clinic doctors and employees being stalked;
hostile and aggressive antiabortionists subjected patients to
their rhetoric, both verbally and forcibly, thus endangering the
patients' health.251 Furthermore, at the time certiorari was
granted, one abortion doctor had been murdered in a nearby
county, and several clinics nationwide had been subjected to
bombings and fires.252 With this terror being visited upon the
reproductive health care centers, doctors and employees alike
had been resigning from their health care facilities in fear for
their lives.253 In light of these facts, it is obvious that the pro-
245. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
248. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 626 So.2d 664, 669 (Fla.
1993).
249. Id. at 668.
250. Id. at 669.
251. See Brief for Respondent at 7, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114
S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880).
252. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
253. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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tests were "operat[ing] destructively as force and intimida-
tion."254 Thus, the lower court judge was justified in issuing an
injunction setting a 300 foot buffer zone around the clinic and
around the residences of clinic employees. 255 The injunction
burdened no more speech than necessary to give complete relief
to the clinic patients and staff, and included adequate restraint
on future activity to prevent any tragic consequences.
Throughout the history of this country, many and varied
groups have raised the public's awareness as to their situations
and political dilemmas through protests.256 The Court has re-
peatedly recognized the right of these groups to express them-
selves through protests.257 However, when the protests turn
violent, the Court has exercised its power to restrain them.258
Additionally, the Court has upheld injunctions in which the pro-
tests themselves were peaceful, but the undercurrent of vio-
lence was so great that the lower court judge completely
enjoined the protests until the violence stopped.259
In the context of the war over abortion rights, however, the
holding in Madsen has different meanings. In one sense, the
Court has given a license to the lower courts to impose a speech-
free buffer zone around clinics faced with violent protesters. 260
Alternatively, the Court may be construed as failing to give
credence to the fact that antiabortionists are claiming as their
victims abortion doctors, their escorts, and even their employ-
ees. 261 However, it has been illustrated that the Court has tra-
ditionally taken a strict position in making restrictions as
narrow and precise as possible to preserve fundamental First
Amendment protection. 26 2 Where the Court finds lives endan-
gered, however, as in Milk Wagon Drivers, it is willing to uphold
restrictions designed to protect those lives.26 3 The Court
254. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 298.
255. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 669.
256. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312 (1988); N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 445 (1980).
257. Id.
258. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
259. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 298-99.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
261. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 30-33, 47-51 and accompanying text.




demonstrated this even in Madsen, by upholding the thirty-six
foot buffer zone and the noise limitation provisions of the in-
junction.264 By allowing these provisions to stand, the Court en-
abled antiabortionists to express themselves in a somewhat less
intimidating, but no less communicative manner.
Although the Court has addressed the violence occurring at
abortion clinics in earlier cases, Madsen is the first to provide a
solid basis upon which a clinic may bring suit. Previously, the
decisions were based on creatively-used statutes, such as
R.I.C.O. or the Ku Klux Klan Act.26 5 Although success under
R.I.C.O. would result in criminal prosecution of violent protes-
ters, the burden of proving conspiracy among protesters, in
many instances, would be too tenuous. 26 6 Alternatively, the use
of injunctive relief allows a narrow tailoring to the situation at
hand. 26 7 Thus, if a single person is posing a threat, an injunc-
tion may be designed blocking his or her access to a clinic.
Recently, Congress passed a statute that would severely pe-
nalize anyone seeking to prevent an individual's access to a re-
productive health clinic. 268 The Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act provides for criminal as well as civil penalties. 269
As one of the civil penalties, the statute provides for injunctive
reief270 In light of the Court's holding in Madsen, it is likely
that any constitutional challenges to the F.A.C.E. Act will fail,
further ensuring the protection of reproductive choice.
V. Conclusion
The right to free speech is arguably the predominant First
Amendment right. Without that right, the battles that have
been fought, and won, in the area of the right to privacy, includ-
ing a woman's right to choose, never would have come to pass.
However, when the right to speak freely is used to veil practices
264. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
265. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
266. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803
(1994).
267. See supra text accompanying note 169.
268. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
270. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(c)(1)(b) (West 1994).
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of violent intimidation and coercion, it must be restricted so
that other rights can be maintained.
In Madsen, the right of women to have a legal and safe
abortion was being threatened by groups fighting vehemently to
revoke that right. Although the Court promulgated an untena-
ble standard in the realm of speech-restricting injunctions, it
demonstrated through its holding that the right to reproductive
choice can be protected through court-issued injunctions. In
light of the violence visited upon abortion providers, however,
the Court failed to protect those who make the option of an
abortion possible. By invalidating the provision of the injunc-
tion that prohibited the members of Operation Rescue from ap-
proaching patients and staff within 300 feet of the Aware
Woman Center for choice, the Court preserved an outlet for
destruction.
Joanne Neilson*
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